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COURT OF APPEALS, 1955 TERM
Spencer v. Childs inyolved a somewhat more complex consideration and
possessed those indicia sufficient to support an intent to make payment mandatory.
Testatrix' language was clear and precise; it was directed to her children; it immediately preceeded the bequest of the residuary estate from which it was to be
paid, and it prescribed a payment which was exact in amount and identical with
that which testatrix herself had paid previously for sister-in-law's support during
a thirteen-year period. All of these pointed not to an ineffectual wish but to an
affirmative mandatory direction. Further, the children in fact paid the specified
amount to the sister-in-law for two years after testatrix' decease, indicating that
they too took the meaning to be mandatory.
These two cases provide a self-evident lesson for the draftsman. In each case,
the use of precatory language led to extended litigation, involving time and heavy
expense to the parties and to the estates. If precatory expressions must be employed, despite the undesirable consequences which may follow, there should be
at least a clear indication whether such wish or desire is intended to be binding.
Attorney's Fees
In re Bishop's Estate22 involved a claim by legal counsel for services rendered
to decedent. This claim was resisted by the personal representatives who denied
that the appellant attorney had been retained by decedent. The services related to
a certain piece of realty in which the decedent had an interest as, tenant in common
with three others. The four tenants had retained appellant to manage the realty,
contracting for an annual fee plus an additional amount for exceptional transactions outside the scope of routine management. Appellant rendered such a service,
completing some items during decedent's life, and one after his death.
The appellant must show that he was engaged by the decedent to perform
the services sued for or that they were performed with his knowledge or consent
or for his benefit. 23 While he need not show a written contract, he must establish
his claim by a clear and convincing preponderance.2 4 The minutes of the tenants'
meetings in this case supported a finding that the appellant was retained as counsel
by the decedent for the services performed. Appellant was to receive added compensation for exceptional services rendered, he handled problems relating to exceptional leases referred to him by the tenants; he carried on negotiations with their
consent, and he reported monthly on the progress of negotiations. The benefit of
22. 1 N. Y. 2d 385, 135 N. E. 2d 578 (1956).
23. Matter Of Humfreville, 6 App. Div. 535, 39 N. Y. Supp. 550 (1st Dep't
1896); McGrath. v. Alger, 43 App. Div. 496, 60 N..Y. Supp. 122 (2d Dep't 1899);
In r'e Woodin's Estate,31 Misc. 820, 64 N. Y. Supp. 1112 (City Ct. 1900).
24. Caldwell v. Lucas, 233 N. Y. 248, 135 N. E. 321 (1922); In re Ennever's
Estate, 116 Misc. 32, 189 N. Y. Supp. 177 (Surr. Ct. 1921); In re Otis' Estate, 126
Misc. 741, 215 N. Y. Supp. 419 (Surr. Ct. 1926).
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these services were received by decedent; as to that item completed after his
death, the Court found a valid basis in the fact context for an implied contract
between appellant and the benefited representatives of the decedent.
Each case of this nature must be decided on its own merits and no single
factor is necessarily determinative. Rather, the entire pattern must be evaluated
to discover whether the weight of the evidence justifies a finding that the relationship of attorney-client existed.
Joint Savings Accounts
When a deposit in the specified form is made in a joint savings bank
account, a conclusive presumption arises upon the decease of one of the parties
thereto that the intention was to vest title in the survivor, absent a showing of
fraud or undue influence.2 5 As a matter of substantive law, mere compliance with
the statutory requirements makes the evidence of intent irrefutable20 and no
burden of proof falls upon the survivor to substantiate it,27 nor is any proof of
actual intent material.28 Despite this dear language, there remains an issue as to
the actual volition of the person in signing the joint deposit form-i.e., when
the act of making the deposit itself was voluntary, there is a conclusive presumption of intent to vest the monies in the survivor but where the act of depositing
originally was not knowingly, consciously and freely made, the entire transaction
may be seen as a nullity and no presumption may follow. The effect of involuntary
transfers therefore may be distinguished from the results which flow from a volun20
tary establishment of a joint account.
This critical distinction formed the basis for the majority opinion in In re
0
Creekrnore's Estate.3
The decedent while in her final illness had expressed a desire
to execute powers-of-attorney to her daughter to enable the daughter to utilize
four bank accounts for the payment of bills. This desire was communicated to
her attorney who contacted the banks. One of the banks was willing to accept
a power-of-attorney but two others recommended the creation of joint accounts.
The attorney took the proferred forms to the decedent and, after a ten-minute
private conference, the decedent executed all the forms. The daughter claimed the
proceeds of the latter two accounts which represented three-fifths of the decedent's
assets. A beneficiary of these accounts under decedent's will contested.
N. Y. BANKING LAW §239-3.
26. In re Porian-da's Estate, 256 N. Y. 423, 176 N. E. 826 (1931); Walsh v.
Keenan, 293 N. Y. 573, 59 N. E. 2d 409 (1944).
25.

27. In re Feneloe's Estate, 262 N. Y. 308, 186 N. E. 794 (1933).
28. Inda v. Inda, 288 N. Y. 315, 43 N. E. 2d 59 (1942).
29. In re Buchanan's Estate, 184 App, Div. 237, 171 N. Y. Supp. 708 (3d Dep't
1918); In re Fenelon's Estate,262 N. Y. 57, 186 N. E. 201 (1933).
30. 1 N. Y. 2d 284, 135 N. E. 2d 193 (1956).

